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Abstract 
Previous studies of unconscious plagiarism have asked participants to recall their own ideas 
from a previous group-problem solving session, and have typically reported that people 
mistakenly include a partner’s responses when trying to recall their own. To date, there has 
been little research looking at the propensity to include one’s own responses when trying to 
recall a partner’s previous contribution to the group. Experiment 1 demonstrated that 
people make both kinds of source-error during recall, but source errors are more common 
in the recall-partner task. This pattern was replicated in Experiments 2a and 2b with source-
errors and intrusions increasing over a delay. Experiment 3 used an extended version of 
each recall task, in which participants reported all items that came to mind, whilst indicating 
which responses were goal-relevant. The tendency for source-errors to occur more for the 
recall-partner task was shown to be a function of both idea availability and output 
monitoring, whereas the tendency for source-errors to increase over a delay was shown to 
be due solely to output monitoring. Thus, unconscious plagiarism errors are one 
instantiation of the more general problem of source-specified recall, which is influenced 
jointly by processes at generation and output monitoring.   
 
Keywords: unconscious plagiarism, source memory, generation; monitoring, recall.  
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There are many reported disputes about the source of ideas in science, art and 
everyday life (Defeldre, 2005; Taylor, 1965). These usually feature accusations of intellectual 
theft accompanied by counterclaims of innocence of intent. Both sides in such disputes 
could use the experimental literature to support their side of the argument: the accusers 
can cite the many papers on unconscious plagiarism (also known as cryptomnesia) 
demonstrating people to be guilty of reporting someone else’s ideas as their own. In 
mitigation, the accused could show that these errors occur even when participants are 
instructed not to make such errors, or even if they are rewarded for avoiding them (see 
Perfect & Stark, 2008 for a review). Thus anecdotal accounts and experimental evidence 
converge to suggest that recall can involve the accidental appropriation of others’ ideas, 
wittily dubbed as kleptomnesia by Macrae, Bodenhausen and Calvini (1999).  This term 
implies that unconscious plagiarism constitutes a form of intellectual theft, similar to the 
self-serving cases of deliberate plagiarism reported in everyday life. We challenge this 
conclusion here, by showing that people often mistakenly include their own responses when 
recalling their partner’s answers. In fact, giving away ideas in this manner constitutes a 
higher proportion of recall output than the more commonly studied error of unconscious 
plagiarism. 
Is unconscious plagiarism evidence that we steal ideas from others?  
 The experimental literature on unconscious plagiarism is dominated by Brown and 
Murphy’s (1989) paradigm. This begins with a group of participants taking turns to 
individually generate solutions to a presented problem. Later individual group members are 
instructed to recall their own responses, avoiding those generated by others. Finally, 
participants attempt to generate new solutions, avoiding all old responses including their 
own.  Brown and Murphy (1989) reported plagiarism at above-chance rates for both the 
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recall-own and generate-new tasks, a pattern subsequently replicated many times (e.g. 
Brown & Halliday, 1991; Landau & Marsh, 1997; Marsh & Bower, 1993; Marsh & Landau, 
1995;  Foley, Foley, Durley & Maitner, 2006; Marsh, Landau & Hicks, 1997; Perfect, Defeldre, 
Elliman & Dehon, 2011; Perfect & Stark, 2012; Stark, Perfect & Newstead, 2005; Stark & 
Perfect, 2006, 2007, 2008: see Gingerich & Sullivan, 2013 for a recent review). Here we 
focus only on plagiarism during recall.  
The widespread adoption of the Brown and Murphy (1989) paradigm has had the 
unfortunate consequence of producing an incomplete picture of source-errors in recall. 
Because the prior work only uses a recall-own task, the only errors detectable involve the 
mistaken recall of a partner’s responses.  This methodology doesn’t measure whether a 
participant fails to output one of their own responses because they believe it came from 
their partner. Nor does it measure the extent to which people would give away their own 
responses when attempting to recall their partner’s responses. Consequently, the literature 
is replete with examples of individuals claiming other’s ideas, but contains almost no 
examples of ideas being given away or withheld.  
This focus on people’s tendency to plagiarise the work of others is consistent with 
social research demonstrating egocentric bias in recall of work with partners. For example, 
Ross and Sicoly (1979) ran a series of studies in which individuals judged responsibility for 
group work, such as which spouse contributes more housework (Experiment 1) or how 
much input a supervisor and a student have on a thesis (Experiment 5). They reported a 
general egocentric bias, such that people attributed the majority of joint work to 
themselves, such that the combined input from both partners often exceeded the total 
amount of work. (For similar examples of egocentric bias in recall see Stephenson and 
Wicklund, 1983; Hyman, Roundhill, Werner & Rabiroff, 2014). The notion of an egocentric 
 RUNNING HEAD: UNCONSCIOUS PLAGIARISM     6 
 
bias in recall of input is also consistent with the many cases of plagiarism of literary or 
musical content reported in the media. In contrast, to our knowledge there are no reported 
cases of artists or writers accidentally (rather than deliberately) claiming their own work 
being by someone else. In this context, it is perhaps understandable why some have claimed 
that unconscious plagiarism errors are an example of an egocentric bias (Macrae, 
Bodenhausen & Calvini, 1999; Wicklund, Reuter & Schiffmann, 1988). However, this 
conclusion is not supported by research on bias in source judgements.  
Is there a bias towards plagiarism in source-monitoring judgements?  
Memory bias toward or away from the self has been studied most extensively in the 
source monitoring literature.  A common approach in such studies is to have participants 
presented with one set of items, whilst generating or imagining another set (e.g.  
Hashtroudi, Johnson & Chrosniak, 1989). Later at test, participants are presented with old 
and new items, and asked to judge each item as to whether it is old or new, and to judge its 
source. These two judgements are made either independently in two phases (e.g. Starns, 
Hicks, Brown & Martin, 2008), or in a single combined decision (e.g. Hashtroudi et al, 1989). 
Three findings are commonly reported. First, memory is superior for items generated rather 
than perceived, consistent with the generation effect. Second, people confuse perceived 
items as having been generated and generated items as having been perceived.  Third, 
falsely recognised new items are most often attributed to the external source – the it-had-
to-be-you effect (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Hashtroudi et al, 1989; Hoffman, 1997).  
Marsh, Landau and Hicks (1997) demonstrated all these effects in a series of 
experiments looking at the rate of source-errors in recognition tasks involving new items, 
items generated by the participants, and items generated by other group members. In all 
experiments, participants were more likely to mistakenly label their own responses as 
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coming from their partners than to label a partner’s responses as their own. That is, old 
items were subject to the same it-had-to-be you bias as new ones. However, a complicating 
factor in these experiments was that the participants originally generated the answers in 
groups of varying sizes, and so any individual only generated a minority of items. Thus, the 
tendency to attribute items to another group member could result from a heuristic 
reflecting the base-rate probabilities. In the absence of source-specifying information, an 
item is most likely to have come from someone else.  Consistent with this observation, the 
relative rates of plagiarism (claiming someone else’s response was self-generated) and anti-
plagiarism (attributing one’s own response to someone else) across experiments reflected 
the relative size of the groups involved.  Those experiments in which participants generated 
a higher proportion of the original ideas resulted in higher rates of claiming other’s ideas 
and lower rates of giving ideas away. Nevertheless, in all studies, giving away ideas was 
more frequently observed.  
The one study to date to look at these two forms of source error in a recall-based 
paradigm was by Perfect, Field and Jones (2009). Participants initially worked with a partner 
to generate solutions to problems concerning health and the environment, and so base-rate 
generation was controlled.  At the start of the experiment, the participant’s partner (a 
confederate) declared themselves to be an expert in one of the two topics under discussion. 
After the generation phase, participants thought of ways of improving half the ideas from 
each topic, before later recalling either their own ideas or their partner’s ideas, and then 
finally generating new solutions to the same topics. With respect to the recall tasks, the 
results demonstrated more correct recall for ideas generated than for ideas heard from a 
partner, consistent with the generation effect (Slamecka & Graf, 1978), regardless of 
expertise (see Perfect, Field & Jones, 2009, Table 1).  There was no difference in the 
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frequency of source errors across recall tasks overall, but this was qualified by an interaction 
with improvement; for the unimproved ideas, giving away ideas (in the recall-partner task) 
was more frequent than plagiarism (in the recall-own task). For improved ideas, the pattern 
was reversed. Thus, this study suggests that source-errors occur in both recall tasks, but is 
equivocal about which form of error is most likely to occur. However, it is unsafe to draw 
firm conclusions on this basis, because the study involved a manipulation of expertise and 
an elaboration phase during which half the ideas were improved.  
To summarise, the recall-based unconscious plagiarism literature has almost 
exclusively focused on one form of error, namely the tendency to steal ideas from others. In 
contrast, the recognition-based source-monitoring literature has measured both intellectual 
theft and generosity, and suggests that giving away ideas is more common than stealing 
them. Only one recall-based study has looked at both forms of source error, but the results 
were inconclusive. Consequently a major focus of the present work is to use recall-based 
methods to measure the tendency to plagiarise a partner or give away our own ideas to 
them. A clear prediction from the source-monitoring research is that giving away ideas 
should be more common than stealing them. However, this prediction neglects key 
differences between recall and recognition.  
Methodological differences between recall and recognition make strong predictions 
hard to sustain. In recognition tests, the experimenter provides the participants with the set 
of items to be judged, whilst in recall, the items are output by the participants. Thus, in 
recall, source-judgements are made only for a subset of items which may not be 
representative of the full-set of ideas originally generated. In free-recall, participants are 
likely to recall the strongest memories, failing to access the weakest, and choosing not to 
report intermediate-strength memories that are accessed with little confidence (Koriat & 
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Goldsmith, 1996).  In contrast, recognition tests require source judgements about all the 
items (or a randomly selected subset of them) and so include many which would be unlikely 
to be output during recall. Given that we know that people falsely attribute new items to an 
external source, it is perhaps not surprising that they make the same errors for old items 
that they remember very poorly. But this does not make it certain that they would make the 
same attribution for responses strong enough to be recalled.  
A second complication flows from the same issue.  In recognition-based source-
memory tests, source-errors are considered as a function of the original source, that is, as 
an input-bound measure of performance (e.g. Marsh, Landau & Hicks, 1997). However, 
unconscious plagiarism research based upon recall has typically looked at the proportion of 
output on a given task that comes from the wrong source (e.g. Stark, Perfect & Newstead, 
1995; Tenpenny, Kelriazakos, Lew, & Phelan, 1998). As Koriat and Goldsmith (1994) 
discussed, these different approaches to methodology and analysis can have profound 
impacts upon the theoretical conclusions drawn.   
Early selection and late-correction processes in recall 
 In addition to the methodological issues, there is a more fundamental distinction 
between recall and recognition based tests. As discussed above, in a recognition-based test, 
each item is generated by the experimenter. Consequently, differential rates of source-
errors cannot be attributed to any generation process. In contrast, in a recall-based test, the 
participant must first generate each item before engaging in any source-monitoring 
judgement of it.  That is, the likelihood of a source error in recall is driven by retrieval 
processes as well as by source-monitoring, but source errors in recognition are only driven 
by the latter.   
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Recently there has been growing interest in the interactive roles of generation and 
monitoring as means to achieve quality control in memory. For instance, consider the 
examples of trying to recall what you wore to the last party you attended, versus recalling 
what you wore to the last fancy-dress party you attended. The former case is a less specific 
retrieval cue, and so you may have generated several potential responses, and had to 
carefully monitor them to evaluate which option was most likely to be correct. Jacoby, 
Kelley and McElree (1999) call this form of control late-correction. In contrast, for the fancy-
dress example, it is more likely that very few responses came to mind, and so very little 
evaluation was required. In Jacoby, Kelley and McElree’s (1999) terminology, this is control 
by early selection.  The role of monitoring in control of memory quality may vary as a 
function of the specificity of the retrieval process that can be run. One way to enable a 
specific retrieval process is to engage in distinctive encoding (Halamish, Goldsmith & Jacoby, 
2012). Recently, Hunt and Smith (2014) looked at the role of generation and monitoring 
processes in the ability to selectively recognise items from one of two studied lists, which 
were encoded either using the same encoding instructions (category membership or 
pleasantness ratings for each item) or different encoding instructions for each list. In one 
experiment, participants made recognition judgements for items from both lists either 
under self-paced or speeded conditions.  Speeded recognition removed the ability to 
distinguish the two lists if they had been encoded using the same instructions, suggesting 
that late monitoring was required to solve the task, but insufficient time had been given to 
achieve it. However, participants were still able to distinguish the lists that had been 
encoded with different instructions under speeded testing. Hunt and Smith (2014) 
concluded that the distinctive encoding enabled participants to constrain their retrieval to 
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the target list, thus avoiding false positive errors for the non-target list, despite the lack of 
late monitoring.  
The relevance of this early-selection late-correction framework to the task of 
recalling items from one source or the other is clear. The instruction to freely recall their 
own or their partner’s ideas may result in differences in the specificity of the retrieval 
process, or the engagement of monitoring. There are good a priori reasons to suspect that 
both may be the case. For example, the benefits of internal generation over external 
perception have been attributed to increased distinctiveness (Kinoshita, 1989), and so one 
might expect self-generated items to be more distinctively encoded in memory. Thus, recall 
of own ideas may be more amenable to a narrow early-selection process. Additionally, 
responses from each source may also be subject to different levels of output monitoring.  
According to the Source Monitoring Framework output monitoring processes are effortful, 
and may not be adequately engaged if the primary retrieval task is too demanding (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993). Given that it is harder to recall a partner’s ideas than one’s 
own, a clear prediction is that less monitoring will occur during the recall-partner task.   
Consequently, we predict that participants will be more likely to include their own 
ideas when recalling their partner’s ideas than to include their partner’s ideas when 
recalling their own ideas. However, to date, no one has tested the idea in a simple 
paradigm, and so in the present work we return to the methods used in the original 
demonstrations of unconscious plagiarism by Brown and Murphy (1989), but include a 
recall-partner condition to test the tendency to make source errors of donation of own 
ideas. To avoid any potential influence of base-rate differences in the likelihood of 
responses being attributed to self or others, we used dyads taking turns to generate items 
rather than groups. This enabled us to determine the relative strength of any bias towards 
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or away from the self in the absence of any heuristic bias towards the most likely source. 
Pairs (or virtual pairs) have often been successfully used in research on unconscious 
plagiarism (Marsh & Bower, 1993; Landau & Marsh, 1997; Macrae, Bodenhausen & Calvini, 
1999; Perfect, Field & Jones, 2009).  
Four experiments are reported: Experiment 1 provides a straightforward comparison 
of source-errors in recall of own and partner responses. Experiment 2a extends this work by 
introducing a delay prior to recall and follow-up Experiment 2b extends by having 
participants recall both sources simultaneously.  Experiment 3 extends the paradigm further 
by directly exploring the role of early retrieval processes and late monitoring processes in 
the rate of errors in the two retrieval tasks. 
Before we present the experiments, we need to explain our methodological and 
analytic approach. Our interest in errors made during free-recall requires that participants 
are free to report what they wish in response to the cues and instructions provided. This 
distinguishes our approach from recognition-based measures of source-memory as 
discussed above, but it also distinguishes it from some earlier work on unconscious 
plagiarism that used forced report recall (e.g. Brown and Murphy, 1989; Marsh & Bower, 
1993). That is, if a participant had originally generated four responses to a cue, they were 
required to recall four at test. As Perfect and Stark (2008) pointed out, this results in many 
low confidence responses being generated, and questions whether such responses truly 
represent wrong-source errors. Participants may seek to comply with forced-report 
instructions by giving responses they know to be source errors.   
Consequently, in all but one of the studies reported here, participants were asked to 
retrieve responses from one source only, accompanied by a warning to try to avoid answer 
from the alternate source. However, beyond this instruction, they were free to report what 
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they wished.  Whilst this does not preclude the possibility of errors made knowingly, it does 
reduce their likelihood. However, the use of this method complicates the analysis and 
interpretation of source errors, because both memory strength and report criterion are 
likely to vary across the recall-own and recall-partner tasks.  Figure 1 illustrates the different 
measures generated by this methodology. In line with previous research (e.g. Perfect, Stark 
& Newstead, 2005; Stark & Perfect, 2007, 2008; Perfect, Field & Jones, 2009), we report 
both the absolute rate of unconscious plagiarism errors and the proportion of a participant’s 
output that these errors represent.  This latter measure is the one reported by Brown and 
Murphy (1989) in their original demonstration, albeit they used a forced-report criterion 
that was fixed for all participants, such that proportion of source errors is equivalent to 
absolute rate. Note, we prefer to include intrusion errors in our report of source error rate, 
because we are interested in the rate of errors in a participant’s output, rather than the rate 
of old ideas that wrongly intrude (excluding new ideas). However, if we had adopted this 
alternate measure of source error rate, all the conclusions reached regarding the effects of 
task (and delay) on source errors in the Experiments reported here would remain unaltered.  
The analyses of source errors described in the previous paragraph are contingent on 
task output: that is they look at output errors given the retrieval task undertaken, in line 
with all previous work on unconscious plagiarism. However, our novel use of recall-partner 
task provides the opportunity to look at wrong-source errors contingent upon original 
source, in line with recognition-based source monitoring studies. That is, we might wish to 
ask what proportion of ideas from one source end up being wrongly recalled (during recall 
from the alternate source), compared to being correctly recalled (during recall from the 
correct source).  This approach is closer to that used in source-recognition work, in that it 
looks at errors contingent upon original source, but it deviates from that procedure in that it 
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only looks at items recalled, not all the original ideas. However, to formally analyse such 
data requires that participants recall ideas from both sources during an experiment, which is 
contrary to work in the unconscious plagiarism literature. In the present set of studies, 
participants recalled from both sources in Experiments 1 and 2b, and so we report the 
source-contingent analyses in those experiments. In the other Experiments (2a and 3) we 
can only discuss the pattern in the group means.  
We begin with a straightforward comparison of performance on recall-own and 
recall-partner tasks. Our prediction, based upon the source-monitoring literature, was that 
participants would attribute weakly-recalled ideas to a partner, and so be more likely to 
output errors during a recall-partner task, than during a recall-own task, in line with the 
performance seen in the control condition of Perfect, Field and Jones (2009) 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants: Forty undergraduate volunteers from the University of Plymouth participated 
on a voluntary basis or for partial course credit. In this, and all subsequent experiments, 
participants signed up to a time-slot on a web-based participation system, and experimental 
dyads were created by pairing the two individuals who signed up to the same time slot.  
 
Procedure: Participants, working in pairs at their own rate, alternated in orally generating 
responses to 2-letter word-stem cues (BE, TH, FO, MA, ST, RE, SP, PE), until each had 
generated 6 exemplars to each of 8 cues. The experimenter verbally introduced each cue in 
turn, and prompted each participant to respond alternately, writing down their responses as 
they spoke. Exact repetitions, or derivations of previously presented words (e.g. Fools or 
Foolish following Fool) were corrected and replacement responses sought, though these 
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errors were not recorded and so frequency data for these corrections are not available.  
Once all legitimate responses had been generated for a given cue, the experimenter 
introduced the next cue. The order of generation alternated across cues, such that each 
participant spoke first for half of the cues.  A 3-minute filled interval followed in which 
participants individually completed Sudoku puzzles. At test, participants were given 2 recall 
sheets each divided into four quadrants. Each quadrant contained an orthographic cue, and 
prompted up to 6 responses by means of 6 asterisk symbols.  Participants were instructed to 
freely recall their own answers for one response sheet (containing one set of four cues), and 
their partner’s answers for the other response sheet (containing the other set of four cues).  
In the recall-own task, participants were verbally told to recall only the answers that they 
had previously generated, and to try to avoid answers that their partner had previously 
generated (with the source instructions reversed for the recall-partner task). The 
assignment of cues to recall task, and order of recall tasks was counterbalanced across 
participants. Thus, the maximum number of correct responses on each recall task was 24, 
with the potential to recall the same number from the wrong source, with the same for 
novel intrusions, with the caveat that the total number of responses overall was capped at 
24.  For example, to the cue BE___, a participant might recall beat, bell, bean, bed, and 
bend. The experimenter then coded these responses by original source to determine the 
rate of correct recall (e.g. beat, bell, bed), wrong-source errors (e.g. bean) and novel 
intrusions (e.g. bend). These three response types were then summed across cues, as 
appropriate.  Participants were given 4 minutes to complete the recall task.  
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 shows how performance varied as a function of the recall-task. Responses 
were scored as correct if they duplicated a previous verbal response from the correct 
 RUNNING HEAD: UNCONSCIOUS PLAGIARISM     16 
 
source, regardless of spelling or plurality (e.g. if a partner had said “bean” to the cue 
BE____, we would have counted all the following responses as correct: been, bean, beans).  
We used the same criteria to score wrong-source errors. All responses that could not be 
traced back to one of the two sources were classified as intrusion errors. We do not report 
means by order of tasks, because it had no impact upon performance, but we included this 
factor in our analyses.  
Correct recall was higher for the recall-own task, F(1,38) = 75.82, p < .001, MSe = 
8.13, partial eta2 = .666, but was not influenced by the order of the recall tasks, F(1,38) = 
1.62, p = .21, MSe = 12.37, partial eta2 = .041, and there was no task by order interaction, F 
< 1. Wrong-source recall was higher for the recall-partner task, F(1,38) = 5.46, p = .025, MSe 
= 1.67, partial eta2 = .13, but was not influenced by task order, F(1,38) = 2.38, p = .13, MSe = 
5.05, partial eta2 = .059, and there was no task by order interaction, F < 1. For novel 
intrusions, there was no reliable tendency to attribute to one source over another, F(1,38) = 
2.90, p = .10, MSe = 3.63, partial eta2 = .071, and nor was there an effect of task order F < 1, 
and no task by order interaction, F < 1.  
The analyses above were based upon the absolute rate of wrong-source errors, but 
this neglects the context of lower overall recall in the recall-partner task. Consequently we 
also calculated the output-bound proportion of wrong-source errors, that is, the proportion 
of all items generated during retrieval that came from the wrong source. Analysis of the 
wrong-source error rates calculated in this manner confirmed the greater propensity to give 
away answers than to steal them, F(1,39) = 18.9, p < .001, MSe = .012, partial eta2 = .332.  
Finally, we analysed the source error data contingent upon the original source of the 
ideas, rather than the retrieval task (see Figure 1). In order to do this, we took the correct 
source recall for one set of items, and the wrong-source recall for the complementary set, 
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and calculated the proportion of wrong-source errors for each source. Overall, there was no 
evidence of a difference in the rate of source errors from each source, (Own responses, M = 
0.113, SD = 0.15, Partner responses, M = .169, SD = 0.26), F < 1.  Order did not affect source 
errors, and there was no source by order interaction (both Fs < 1.03, ps > .31).  
Experiment 1 therefore produced two clear patterns. Consistent with our 
expectations, participants made more source-errors in the recall-partner task, suggesting 
that the mostly commonly studied source error in recall, unconscious plagiarism, is the less 
frequent error. At the same time, analysis of source-errors contingent upon the original 
source suggested that own-ideas and partner’s ideas are equally susceptible to being output 
during the wrong task, at least for the subset of items recalled. We reserve discussion of this 
pattern until we have further replicated it.  
Experiments 2a and 2b 
Whilst the pattern of findings in Experiment 1 was quite clear, the experiment had a 
number of sub-optimal features that we sought to improve.  Participants in Experiment 1 
recalled their own answers for some category cues and their partner’s answers to other 
category cues within a single experimental session, counterbalanced across order.  This 
methodology is not optimal for looking at biases in source attribution because the short 
retention interval means that rates of wrong-source errors may have been suppressed. 
Consequently, in Experiment 2a we sought to increase wrong-source errors by increasing 
the delay prior to test (Brown & Halliday, 1991; Landau & Marsh, 1997, Marsh & Bower, 
1993). Also, although the within-subject manipulation of recall cue is statistically sensitive, it 
raises the possibility of carryover effects caused by the increased salience of the alternate-
source cue which might emerge over a delay. To avoid such a possibility, and to make the 
task more directly comparable to previous demonstrations of unconscious plagiarism, we 
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used a between-subject manipulation of task. That is, participants only attempted a single 
form of recall-task during this experiment, and so for half the participants (in the recall-own 
condition), this was effectively the standard Brown and Murphy (1989) procedure. However, 
this methodology precludes direct analysis of the source errors contingent upon the original 
source, and so we ran an additional follow-up study (Experiment 2b) in which participants 
recalled from both sources. We describe this study later.  
In Experiment 1 participants were reminded of the number of target responses they 
were seeking to recall to each cue. Although participants were free to recall however many 
they wished to report without guess, the prompt that there were 6 target responses per cue 
may have induced pressure to guess responses, which may explain why such high error rates 
were observed with a short delay.   Consequently, in Experiment 2a we removed this cue by 
providing participants with a blank response sheet that did not cue the number of potential 
responses. In this, and subsequent experiments we recorded all duplications at generation, 
and removed all such items from subsequent analyses. We also removed the time-limit on 
recall.   
 At the same time, we changed from an orthographic cue task to a semantic cue task, 
in which the dyads originally generated members of semantic categories. This task has been 
used many times in previous research (e.g. Brown & Murphy, 1989; Brown & Halliday, 1991, 
Marsh & Landau, 1995), and provides an opportunity to replicate the pattern seen in 
Experiment 1 with a new task. The primary focus of this study is to determine whether 
participants would once again falsely intrude their own responses when attempting to recall 
their partner’s more often than they would include their partner’s responses when recalling 
their own.  
Experiment 2a 
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Method 
Participants: Forty undergraduate students or volunteers participated either for partial 
course credit or payment of £12 (c. $19.5) for attendance at 3 test sessions.  Twenty were 
tested in the recall-own condition, and 20 in the recall-partner condition.  
 
Procedure: Participants, working in pairs at their own rate, alternated in orally generating 
responses to semantic category cues, until each had generated 8 exemplars to each of 8 
categories (Articles of clothing, Fruit, Four-footed animals, Articles of furniture, Weather 
phenomena, Kitchen utensils, Sports, Parts of the human body). Each participant returned 
individually twice for separate recall sessions, after 1 and 7 days. Because testing was done 
individually, participants did not return for testing at precisely the same time of day, but 
made individual arrangements with the experimenter, who was present for all test sessions.  
In Experiment 2a, for each test, participants were presented with a different half of 
the category cues. That is, no category cue was tested twice, in order to avoid potential 
carry-over effects across recall-sessions.  Participants were instructed to write down only 
their own or their partner’s responses as appropriate, avoiding responses from the wrong 
source.  Thus, for each recall task there was a maximum of 32 items that could potentially 
be recalled from the correct source, 32 from the wrong source, plus any number of novel 
intrusions. All recall tasks were self-paced. Duplications during generation were rare and 
responses associated with such duplications were excluded from the analyses. We scored 
correct recall, wrong-source recall and intrusions in the same manner as Experiment 1. 
Unlike in Experiment 1 participants very occasionally generated responses that were not 
legitimate members of a category, but were nonetheless clearly semantically related (e.g. 
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“venison” in response to the cue “Four-footed animals”). We did not correct such 
responses, and nor did we exclude them from the final analyses.   
Results and Discussion 
Mean frequencies of correct recall, wrong-source errors and intrusions for the recall-
own, and recall-partner tasks are shown in Table 2.  
Performance (correct recall, wrong-source recall, intrusions) was examined using 
separate 2 (delay: 1 day vs. 1 week), x 2 (task: recall-own vs. recall-partner) mixed ANOVAs 
with repeated measures on the first factor. Correct recall decreased over the delay, F(1,38) 
= 96.21, p < .001, MSe = 6.06, partial eta2 = 0.717, was higher for the recall-own task, F(1,38) 
= 77.07, p < .001, MSe = 14.99, partial eta2 = 0.670, but there was no interaction, F < 1. 
Wrong-source recall increased after a delay, F(1,38) = 19.79, p< .001, MSe = 5.35, partial 
eta2 = 0.342, was higher in the recall-partner task, F(1,38) = 13.41, p = .001, MSe = 10.87, 
partial eta2 = 0.261, but there was no interaction, F(1,38) = 1.13, MSe = 5.35, p = .294, 
partial eta2 = .029.  Intrusions of novel answers also increased after a delay, F(1,38) = 15.45, 
p < .001, MSe = 4.31, partial eta2 = 0.289, and were more frequent in the recall-partner task, 
F(1,38) = 16.38, p < .001, MSe = 6.32, partial eta2 = 0.301, but there was no interaction, F < 
1.  
 Because recall varied across conditions and delay, we also looked at the output-
bound proportion of source errors, as before. There was a higher proportion of wrong-
source errors after a delay, F(1,38) = 24.26, p = .001, MSe = .010, partial eta2 = .390, and for 
the recall-partner task, F(1,38) = 22.66, p < .001, MSe = .017, partial eta2 = .374, but there 
was no interaction between delay and task, F(1,30) = 2.15, p = .15, MSe = .010, partial eta2 = 
.054. 
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 Experiment 2a therefore replicated the pattern seen in Experiment 1. Both after a 
day and a week, recall-partner recall contained twice as many source errors than did recall-
own recall.  Delay increased wrong-source recall errors overall but did not interact with the 
nature of the errors. The same pattern was also observed for intrusion errors: participants 
were biased towards attributing new items to their partners at both delays. 
However, as we acknowledged above, restricting participants to only one kind of 
retrieval task precluded formal analysis of the source-contingent error rates. Nevertheless, 
the group-mean data shown in Table 2 is consistent with the observation in Experiment 1 
that the bias in task-based analyses is absent in the source-based analyses. Based on the 
group averages,  the one-day delay condition showed that own ideas were wrongly 
attributed 13.6% of the time, and partner ideas 9.0% of the time, and after a week’s delay,  
own ideas were misattributed 27.3% of the time, and partner ideas 24.3%.  Because we are 
not able to statistically confirm this pattern, we ran a follow up study in which participants 
were asked to recall ideas from both sources.  
Experiment 2b 
Method 
Participants: Twenty participants were recruited from the same volunteer panel, on the 
same basis as Experiment 2a, but one participant did not attend the final test session, and 
so did not contribute data to the analyses.  
 
Procedure: The procedure duplicated Experiment 2a in all respects other than the final test. 
Participants were required to recall ideas from both sources using a response sheet with 
two columns, headed “Own answers” and “Partner’s answers”. Participants were free to 
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report all the previous responses to each cue that they could recall, but were required to 
identify the source of each response by means of these two columns.   
Results and Discussion 
 We begin with an analysis of task-contingent performance. Responses in each 
column were treated equivalently to the single-source recall data in Experiment 2a, that is 
items written in the “Own answers” were treated as items recalled to the recall-own 
instruction, and those in the “Partner’s answers” treated as recall-partner items. These data 
are shown in Table 3.  
 Participants correctly recalled more own ideas than partner ideas, F(1,18) = 142.4, p 
< .001, MSe = 7.04, partial eta2 = .888, and more ideas after 1 day than one week, F(1,18) = 
32.25, p < .001, MSe = 17.65, partial eta2 = .642, but these two factors did not interact, F < 1.  
The absolute rate of wrong-source errors was higher after a delay, F(1,18) = 19.23, p< .001, 
MSe = 3.65, partial eta2 = .517, but did not differ by source, F < 1, and there was no 
interaction between source and delay, F(1,18) = 1.59, MSe = 0.953, p = .213, partial eta2 = 
.085. Source errors as a proportion of output written in a column were higher in the recall-
partner column, F(1,18) = 6.39, p = .021, MSe = .006, partial eta2 = .262. The proportion of 
source errors increased over a delay, F(1,18) = 25.85, p < .001, MSe = .006, partial eta2 = 
.590  and there was an interaction between source and delay, F(1,18) = 4.98, p = .039, MSe = 
.003, partial eta2 = .217. Intrusion errors were more common after a delay, F(1,18) = 20.33, 
p < .001, MSe = 4.79, partial eta2 = .530, and more common in the partner-answer column, 
F(1,14) = 16.52, p= .001, MSe = 2.68, partial eta2 = .479, but these two factors did not 
interact, F < 1.   
The error data were then analyzed contingent upon the original source. Analysis of 
the proportion of wrong-source errors from each source showed a main effect of delay, 
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F(1,18) = 23.18, p < .001, MSe = .011, partial eta2 = .563, a numerical trend for more errors 
in attributing partner response, F(1,18) = 3.82, p = .066, MSe = .008, partial eta2 = .175, but 
no interaction, F < 1. After one day 6.3% (SD 5.3%) of generated own ideas were attributed 
to the wrong source compared to 9.4% (SD 7.3%) of generated partner ideas. After 1 week, 
these rates increased to 17.2% (SD 11.3%) of own ideas and 22.1% (SD 16.9%) of partner 
ideas. Thus, the pattern resembled that seen in Experiment 1, with a non-significant 
tendency for partner ideas to be wrongly attributed more often than own ideas. But, given 
that this effect was not significant in either experiment, the safest conclusion is that the 
source-contingent analysis shows no reliable pattern of bias across sources. We return to 
this issue after we present Experiment 3.  
 Experiment 2b was different from the previous studies reported here in that it 
required participants to retrieve previous answers from both sources, and then to attribute 
each response to a previous source. Thus, throughout the retrieval period, participants were 
aware of the salience of the source during retrieval, and could not output a response 
without making an explicit source-judgment. Thus, it seems unlikely that source-neglect 
(Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993) contributed to the pattern of errors observed in this 
study, whilst it could have occurred in previous experiments. This methodological change 
may have contributed to the failure to replicate the significant effect of retrieval task on the 
absolute rate of source-errors: here the numerical pattern was consistent with that seen 
earlier, but it did not reach significance.  
Experiment 3 
 So far, source errors have been analyzed a function of task and source, and the two 
methods appear to give different patterns. The task-based analyses consistently show more 
errors in the recall-partner task, while the source-based analyses show little evidence for a 
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difference in rate of errors for own or partner’s responses. At first blush, these two patterns 
may appear incompatible, but in fact both effects may reflect the differential availability of 
items from each source. 
 All the experiments to date have shown higher correct recall for own responses than 
for a partner’s responses, in line with the generation effect (Slamecka & Graf, 1978).  Thus, 
at test, regardless of the retrieval task, more own-responses than partner-responses may be 
available for retrieval.   If so then the recall-own task combines highly available correct 
responses (own-ideas) with less available incorrect responses (partner-ideas) whilst the 
recall-partner has the reverse combination. In contrast, the source-based analysis corrects 
for the different base-rates of recall by looking at highly available errors (own ideas recalled 
incorrectly during the recall partner task) as a proportion of highly available ideas (own 
ideas recalled in both tasks) and comparing this to the proportion of less available errors 
(partner ideas recalled incorrectly) as a proportion of less available responses (all partner 
ideas). Thus, the source-based analysis does not lead to an expectation of bias across source 
if the two sources differ in availability.   
A difficulty with the foregoing argument is that we do not yet have a measure of 
availability, only what is reported. What is reported during a retrieval task is likely to be a 
function of the availability (early selection) but also reflects the likelihood of an idea being 
reported (late correction). The previous experiments do not allow us to separate these 
processes, and so we do not have a pure measure of the availability of the ideas during each 
retrieval task. This is the main purpose of Experiment 3. 
What we do know with more certainty is that the two retrieval tasks differ in rates of 
intrusion errors. Given that intrusion errors are not ideas associated with sources that differ 
in strength, this suggests a role for output monitoring, or late-correction, in the genesis of 
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these errors. One simple late-correction explanation for this is that report criterion differs 
across the two recall-tasks, such that people are more liberal when trying to report their 
partner’s responses. This would lead to more intrusion errors, but it would also lead to more 
wrong-source errors being output. Thus, wrong-source errors might involve a late-
correction element. 
Source-monitoring theory can also be used to explain why late-correction processes 
may differ across tasks. According to the Source-Monitoring Framework (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993), source specifying information can be neglected during 
demanding retrieval tasks (Marsh, Landau & Hicks, 1997). Given that the evidence suggests 
that recalling a partner’s ideas is more demanding than recalling our own ideas, it is 
conceivable that source-neglect is more likely to occur during the recall-partner task, 
resulting in more intrusions, and also more source-errors. Alternately, the pattern of errors 
could reflect an attributional process that applies in the absence of source-specifying 
information , the it-had-to-be-you heuristic (e.g. Johnson & Raye, 1981; Hoffman, 1997).  
Rather than failing to consider source, participants may lack the necessary information to 
accurately judge source, and use this absence of information as being (wrongly) diagnostic 
of the idea being externally generated. This too would predict more intrusions and source-
errors during the recall-partner task.  
 Experiment 3 was designed to evaluate the role of early selection and late correction 
processes in the production of wrong-source errors and intrusions.  The role of late-
correction in the maintenance of memory accuracy has been studied most frequently by 
contrasting free- and forced-report, a methodology developed by Koriat and Goldsmith to 
test their memory-control framework (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994, 1996, 2000; Goldsmith and 
Koriat, 2008). The essence of this methodology is that participants generate answers to a 
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cue either under forced report instructions, or with the option to withhold a response. The 
extent to which people are able to trade-off memory quantity (how many correct answers 
are given) for memory accuracy (what proportion of their answers are correct), and 
moderate this in response to goals for accuracy or quantity, is a measure of memory control 
due to late correction.  
More recently, the framework has been further developed to acknowledge the 
potential role of early-selection processes in the genesis of memory errors (e.g. Halamish, 
Goldsmith & Jacoby, 2012; Goldsmith, 2016; Guzel & Higham, 2013).  This work has largely 
been based upon the use of extended recall (Bousfield & Rosner, 1970; Halamish, Goldsmith 
& Jacoby, 2012; Kahana, Dolan, Dauder & Wingfield, 2005). In this procedure, participants 
are asked to report everything that comes to mind in response to a memory cue, but to 
indicate on-line during retrieval which items are appropriate responses to the retrieval cue. 
That is, participants are asked to report all the contents of their early selection processes, 
and then control their output through appropriate late-correction decisions. Kahana et al 
(2005) used this method to look at source-specified recall in a multi-list experiment in which 
participants repeatedly studied and were then tested on lists of words. Participants were 
instructed to recall only the items from the last list studied, but were told to report 
everything that came to mind during this process. Monitoring was measured by instructing 
people to manually indicate with a button press every time they reported an item they 
believed had not come from the last study list. These data were used to determine both the 
extent to which retrieval was specific to the last list studied, and the ability to monitor the 
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accuracy of ideas that came to mind, and so provides an ideal template for our final 
experiment.1  
However, rather than use a button press, we adapted this approach to the present 
paradigm by asking people to write down all responses that came to mind during retrieval 
on a response sheet with two headed columns. One column was headed with the retrieval 
cue (recall own, or recall partner as appropriate), with the other headed “other”, for any 
other answers that came to mind. Thus, if an answer came to mind that the participant 
knew to from the wrong source, or that they thought was novel, rather than withhold it as 
they would have in Experiments 1 and 2, they were encouraged to report it by writing it in 
the “other” column.  We preferred this adaptation of the method over a button press for 
two reasons. First, it retained the use of written responses we used previously, and second, 
monitoring accuracy is not confounded with prospective memory. Button presses are an 
easily omitted response, which could reflect a prospective memory failure as much as a 
monitoring failure, whereas writing a response down in one of two columns ensures 
monitoring occurs for every item output.  
 The extent to which items are available during retrieval is indexed by the tendency 
for items to be written anywhere on the response sheet. Our expectation was that own-
answers would feature as potential competitors during a recall-partner task more often 
than partner-answers would feature during the recall-own task. Within this set of generated 
items, we can then examine the accuracy with which participants report items in the correct 
columns: that is, we can ask what proportion of intrusions and wrong-source errors are 
                                               
1 Halamish, Goldsmith and Jacoby (2012 – Experiment 2) also used an extended recall methodology 
in which participants wrote down all responses that came to mind during retrieval to cue. However, 
their study materials were paired-associates, and so only a single response to a cue was objectively 
correct. Our paradigm involved participants retrieving multiple responses to a single (source) cue and 
so is closer to the approach by Kahana et al., (2005).  
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written in the target column (rather than the “other” column) separately for the recall-own 
and recall-partner tasks. If participants show a bias towards attributing weaker memories to 
their partners, we would expect a higher proportion of responses generated at retrieval to 
be mistakenly included in the recall-partner task than in the recall-own task.   
 Experiment 3 therefore replicates Experiment 2a, except that we used the extended 
recall version of the retrieval task. Additionally, we replaced our within-subjects 
manipulation of delay with a between-subjects manipulation, so that participants were only 
required for a single test session. An account of the previous bias in wrong-source errors 
based entirely upon early-selection would suggest that own responses would be generated 
more often (during the recall-partner task) than partner responses would be generated 
(during the recall-own task), without any bias in subsequent monitoring processes. In 
contrast, an account based entirely upon late-selection would be that the availability of 
responses from both sources is equivalent, but output monitoring is less stringent during 
the recall-partner task, leading to more own-responses being reported. We think such an 
account is unlikely, because the base-rate of generation of the two sources is not matched, 
but we do not rule out a role of bias in late-correction in conjunction with an early-selection 
bias. This view would be supported by the greater propensity to generate own responses, 
and the greater propensity to accept them given that they are generated.  
 This procedure also allows us to distinguish whether the increase in wrong-source 
recall that was observed with delay can be attributed to early selection or late correction 
processes. With increased delay, early selection processes may be less able to selectively 
generate target items rather than non-target items. If so, then wrong-source errors would 
constitute a higher proportion of generated items, and so be more likely to intrude during 
recall, even as overall recall drops. Alternately, late-correction processes could contribute if 
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the ability to distinguish source drops with delay: even if no more wrong-source errors are 
generated, more might be accepted as task compliant. Given that increased source errors 
are found with increased delay in recognition paradigms (Bornstein & Lecompte, 1995), we 
strongly suspect that late-correction processes are partially responsible for the increase in 
the report of wrong-source errors with a delay, but we cannot rule out a role for early 
selection processes as well.  
 The inclusion of the extended recall methodology provides a particular test of the 
use of the it-had-to-be-you heuristic. This predicts that during standard recall procedure, 
intrusion errors are likely to be rejected during a recall-own task, but accepted during a 
recall-partner task. If this is so, then in an extended recall task, the non-target column 
should include more intrusions in the recall-own task (because the responses are rejected as 
not being own) than in the recall-partner task (because they have been accepted as task 
compliant).  
Method 
Participants: Eighty-nine undergraduate students or volunteers attended for partial course 
credit or payment of £8 for attendance. However, only 81 attended the second session of 
the study. In the recall-own condition 20 participants were tested after a 1 day delay, and 20 
after a 1 week delay. In the recall-partner condition, 20 were tested after 1 day, and 21 after 
1 week.     
Procedure: This followed Experiment 2a closely, except for the final test phase. Participants 
returned for only a single test phase, either after 1 day or 1 week, and were tested on their 
recall for all categories at that delay. This effectively doubled the potential number of items 
that could be recalled in a condition, relative to Experiment 2a. The second change was the 
use of an extended-recall task. In each condition (recall-own or recall-partner), participants 
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were given a series of response sheets headed by a category cue (e.g. “items of clothing”), 
and two columns for responses. One column was for task-compliant responses (i.e. own 
answers in the recall-own task, partner answers in the recall-partner task), and the other 
column was for anything else that came to mind. Participants were given the following 
instructions as to how the sheet should be filled out:   
“I want you to try and remember what {you / your partner} came up with last week 
for each category. As you try to remember {your own/ your partner’s} ideas for each 
category, you might remember some ideas {your partner / you} came up with and some 
entirely new, random ideas that you know neither of you actually said. Whenever that 
happens I want you to write down those ideas along the side of the sheet. You can write 
down as many or as few ideas along the side that you know aren’t {yours / your partners} as 
you like or as come to mind, so that the sheet could look something like this: [Show what 
filled-out recall sheets look like.] So essentially, try and write out everything that comes to 
mind. Whenever it’s {your own / your partner’s} idea write it down here, whenever it’s {your 
partner’s / your own} idea or an entirely new idea write it down here, but the task is to try 
and remember {your own / your partner’s} examples. I don’t want you to search your 
memory for {your partner’s / your own} examples or new ideas, just write them down if they 
come to mind as you try and remember what {you / your partner} came up with.” 
Results and Discussion 
Table 4 reports the same measures that were reported in the first two experiments. 
However, because of the use of extended recall, it includes both the number of responses 
that were included as task compliant (i.e. reported) and the total number of responses of 
each kind that were generated (i.e. written anywhere on the response sheet, reported and 
excluded). Before we present the data, we need to explain our terminology. Participants 
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were instructed to recall the responses associated with one source, and so for the responses 
written in the task-compliant column, these could be classified as correct, wrong-source 
errors or intrusions. However, in the “other column”, participants also wrote examples of 
the same three kinds of response, namely their own original responses, their partner’s 
original responses and new responses. For the old ideas it is ambiguous whether these 
responses are errors or not. For example, when attempting to recall a partner’s response, 
generating a response that was originally self-generated is an error, but withholding it is 
correct. Conversely, generating a partner’s response is correct, but withholding it would be 
incorrect. The same issues apply to own ideas and intrusions, except in the latter case, 
withholding is always a correct response. 
Consequently, in addition to the analyses of reported outputs, we looked at the 
generated data in two ways. First, we looked at all the ideas generated in response to the 
retrieval goals, regardless of whether they were reported or not.  This enabled us to classify 
ideas that came to mind as correct, wrong-source errors or intrusions, using a task-
contingent analysis, just as for those that were ultimately reported. We then looked at the 
proportion of the generated ideas that were reported as task-compliant. That is, we looked 
at the ability to monitor the accuracy of available ideas, independent of the frequency with 
which each type of idea came to mind.  
The first question of interest is whether using the extended-recall paradigm alters 
the pattern of responses ultimately reported. Consequently, we first analyzed the responses 
written in the target columns, using a task-contingent analysis, to determine whether we 
replicated the pattern reported in Experiments 1 and 2. These data are reported in the top 
half of Table 4. 
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For correct recall, recall was higher for own answers than for partner answers, F(1,77) 
= 62.18, MSe = 45.19, p < .001, partial eta2 = .447, was higher with a shorter delay, F(1,61) = 
51.11, MSe = 45.19, p < .001, partial eta2 = .399, but these two factors did not interact, F < 1. 
For wrong-source errors, more errors occurred in the recall-partner task than in the recall-
own task, F(1,77) = 14.11, MSe = 17.01, p <.001, partial eta2 = .155, and following a longer 
rather than a shorter delay, F(1,77) = 43.46, MSe = 17.01, p < .001, partial eta2 = .361, but 
these two factors did not interact,  F < 1. More intrusion errors were reported during the 
recall-partner task than during the recall-own task, F(1,77) = 23.80, MSe = 20.05, p < .001, 
partial eta2 = .236, and after a longer delay, F(1,77) = 30.59, MSe = 20.05, p < .001, partial 
eta2 = .284, but these two factors did not interact, F(1,61) = 1.12, MSe = 20.05, p = .293, 
partial eta2 = .014.  
Because the number of responses included varied across tasks and delay, we also 
looked at wrong-source errors as a proportion of responses output. As before, wrong-source 
errors constituted a higher proportion of answers output during the recall-partner task, 
F(1,77) = 24.28, MSe = .005, p < .001, partial eta2 = .240, and after a delay, F(1,77) = 50.14, 
MSe = .005, p < .001, partial eta2 = .394, but there was no interaction, F < 1. 
 Experiment 3 resembled Experiment 2a in that participants only completed a single 
retrieval task and so it was not possible to carry out an analysis of source errors contingent 
upon source. Looking at the group means in Table 4 suggests that there was no clear 
evidence of a bias in errors from each source. After 1 day, 10.5% of own ideas and 7.1% of 
partner ideas were mistakenly reported, while after 1 week, 24.8% of own ideas and 24.0% 
of partner ideas were mistakenly reported2.  
                                               
2 Note: this analysis assumes that these two responses are exclusive, but this may not be the case. 
For example, participants who wrongly reported an own-item during the recall-partner task may not 
have excluded it during the recall-own task. The assumption of exclusivity is challenged by changes in 
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Thus, in terms of the answers reported as task-compliant, all previous patterns were 
replicated, suggesting that the use of the recall-everything instructions did not 
fundamentally alter participants’ memory report. Participants were better able to correctly 
recall their own responses than their partner’s, and more likely to wrongly include their own 
responses than their partner’s. This was true whether expressed as an absolute number of 
errors, or as a proportion of answers output.  In addition, as in Experiment 2a, we found 
more wrong-source errors after a 1-week delay than after a 1-day delay. However, when we 
looked at the source-errors contingent upon the original source, there was no apparent 
tendency to misattribute one source more than another. Having established that the recall-
everything methodology produces equivalent performance to that seen previously, our 
attention now turns to examining the generated ideas to determine the roles of early 
selection and late correction in the generation of recall-errors and intrusions.  
Early selection processes 
 The next analysis looked at the total number of answers that were written down by 
the participant anywhere on the response sheet, ignoring the nature of those answers (i.e. 
correct-source, wrong-source or intrusions), which is the sum of the data shown in the 
bottom half of Table 4.  Surprisingly, participants wrote down as many responses for the 
recall-partner task (M= 93.34, SD = 22.43) as they did the recall-own task (M= 95.90, SD = 
19.72), F < 1, and as many responses after 1 week (M = 95.24, SD = 24.63) as 1 day (M 
=93.95, SD = 16.88), F < 1, with no interaction between these two factors, F < 1. Thus 
neither task nor source appeared to influence participant’s willingness to respond. Of course, 
this does not mean that the same kinds of answers came to mind across these different 
conditions.  
                                                                                                                                                  
report threshold across tasks, or from source-neglect which would result in participants reporting an 
item regardless of the goals of the task.   
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 The availability of responses from different sources (i.e. excluding intrusion errors) 
was explored with a 2 (source: own vs. partner) x 2 (task: recall own vs. recall partner) x 2 
(delay: 1 day vs. 1 week) mixed ANOVA on frequency of responses with repeated measures 
on the first factor. Overall, participants generated more of their own answers than their 
partner’s, F(1,77) = 145.02, MSe = 37.05, p < .001, partial eta2 = .653, which was moderated 
by an interaction with task, F(1,77) = 36.19, MSe = 37.05, p < .001, partial eta2 = 0.320. 
Follow-up tests indicated that for the recall-own task, participants generated more of their 
own responses (M = 49.05, SD = 9.40) than their partner’s responses (M = 31.78, SD = 7.89), 
F(1,77) = 161.1, p < .001, partial eta2 = .677, whilst for the recall-partner task participants 
generated fewer of their partner’s answers (M = 35.39, SD = 7.79) than their own (M = 41.16, 
SD = 9.42). Consistent with the successful operation of early-selection processes, follow-up 
tests also indicated that more own answers were generated during the recall-own task than 
during the recall-partner task, F(1,77) = 13.85, p = .003 MSe = 90.98, partial eta2 = .152 and 
more partner-answers were generated during the recall-partner task than during the recall-
own task, F(1,77) = 4.36, p = .04, MSe = 60.68, partial eta2 = .054. 
There was no overall effect of task on number of responses written, F(1,77) = 1.613, 
p = .208, MSe = 114.6, partial eta2 = .021, but there was an overall delay effect, such that 
more old responses were generated after 1 day (M = 42.09, SD = 7.57) than after 1 week (M 
= 36.60, SD = 7.57), F(1,77) = 10.63, MSe = 114.6, p = .002, partial eta2 =.121. However, 
there were no other significant higher order interactions, F < 1 in all cases.  
 The emergence of a delay effect in recall of old responses, coupled with the absence 
of such an effect in overall number of responses is reconciled by inspecting the rate of 
intrusion errors. Overall, participants were more likely to include a novel response in their 
output after 1 week than after 1 day, F(1,77) = 24.24, MSe = 126.05, p < .001, partial eta2 
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= .239. However recall task made no impact upon rate of intrusions that were generated, F < 
1, and nor did this factor interact with delay, F < 1. 
 Thus, whilst the total number of responses generated at retrieval did not vary across 
task or delay, the nature of those responses did. Expressed as a proportion of items 
generated, items from the non-target source were generated more often during the recall-
partner task than the recall-own task, F(1,77) = 44.20, MSe  = .005, p < .001, partial eta2 
= .365, but less often after a delay, F(1,61) = 7.07, MSe  = .005, p= .01, partial eta2 = .084. 
There was no task by delay interaction on the proportion of wrong-source errors generated, 
F(1,61) = 1.046, MSe  = .005, p = .310, partial eta2 = .013. 
 Thus different patterns emerge for the generation of intrusions, and wrong-source 
errors during retrieval, as is illustrated in the panel A of Figure 2. The generation of intrusion 
errors becomes more likely after a delay, but is uninfluenced by the retrieval task, whilst the 
generation of wrong-source errors is influenced by task, but not delay.  
Late correction processes 
 The final analysis was designed to test the effects of task and delay on late-
correction processes. We looked at the ability to correctly reject wrong-source and intrusion 
errors by comparing the proportions of wrong-source errors and intrusions that were 
wrongly assigned to the task-compliant column at each delay. These proportions are 
illustrated in the panel B of Figure 2. We ran a 2 (error type: wrong-source errors vs. 
intrusion errors) x 2 (task: recall-own vs. recall-partner) x 2 (delay: 1 day vs. 1 week) mixed 
ANOVA on the proportion of errors reported with repeated measures on the first factor.  
Participants were more likely to report an intrusion error than a wrong-source error, F(1,77) 
= 42.67, MSe = .031, p < .001, partial eta2 = .357, included more errors in the recall-partner 
task than the recall-own task, F(1,77) = 12.07, MSe = .061, p = .001, partial eta2 = .135, and 
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included more errors after a delay, F(1,77) = 11.40, MSe = .061, p = .001, partial eta2 = .129. 
The only significant higher-order interaction was between error type and task, F(1,77) = 5.88, 
MSe = .031, p = .018, partial eta2 = .071. Follow up tests revealed that a higher proportion of 
intrusions were accepted for the recall-partner task than the recall-own task, F(1,77) = 12.63, 
p = .001, but the rate of acceptance of wrong-source errors did not differ across tasks, 
F(1,77) = 3.47, p = .066. No other interactions were significant, F(1,77)< 3.28, p> .073 in all 
cases. 
 Thus in summary, although the pattern of performance for reported items across 
retrieval task and delay is the same for intrusions and wrong-source errors, it is clear that 
their genesis is different (see Table 4, and panel C of Figure 2 for illustrative purposes). 
Intrusion errors were generated at equal rates across retrieval tasks whilst source errors 
showed an effect of retrieval task. That is, there was an early-selection effect on wrong-
source errors that was absent for intrusion errors. Additionally, it is clear that generated 
wrong-source errors were more likely to be rejected than generated intrusions, suggesting 
active late-correction processes.  
 An obvious potential critique of this experiment is that the addition of the “other” 
column, coupled with the instructions to report everything, has fundamentally changed the 
task. Clearly, our ability to interpret the data from Experiment 3 rests upon people 
accurately reporting what comes to mind, without altering the way in which they sought to 
recall the target answers. Whilst we cannot absolutely refute this critique, we believe there 
are good grounds for drawing firm conclusions from this experiment.  
 The main reason for our confidence is that our findings entirely replicate Experiment 
2a, apart from some clearly predicted deviations. With regards to the memories correctly 
reported as task-compliant, the pattern in Experiment 3 is strikingly similar to Experiment 2a, 
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suggesting that the use of extended recall had not fundamentally altered performance. In 
particular, source-errors on the recall-own task were highly consistent across Experiments: 
Experiment 3 found error rates of 5.2% (after 1 day) and 16.0% (after 1 week), which 
resemble those seen in Experiment 2a (5.7% and 13.4% respectively). For errors on the 
recall-partner task, the pattern was also similar, though errors were slightly lower in 
Experiment 3 (1 day, 12.7%, 1 week, 23.7%) than seen in Experiment 2a (1 day 16.3%, 1 
week, 30.6%).  
With regards to intrusion errors, the pattern was entirely as we predicted from use 
of the it-had-to-be-you heuristic. This heuristic applies when people bring an idea to mind, 
and then decide whether or not to report it. This predicts that intrusion errors should 
appear in the non-target column for the recall-own task, but in the target column for the 
recall-partner task. This is precisely what was found. Based on group averages, Experiment 
2a showed that after a day intrusions constituted 3.0% of recall-own output, and 15.6% of 
recall-partner output, and after a week, the equivalent figures were 10.3% and 22.6%.  The 
task-compliant data in Experiment 3 were remarkably similar. After a day, intrusions 
constituted 2.7% of recall-own, and 11.2% of recall-partner output, and these figures rose to 
11.5% and 23.5% after a week.  However, additionally, intrusion errors showed the pattern 
expected in the full set of items generated (i.e. written in either column), with little 
difference in intrusion rates across recall tasks.  After one day, the intrusions rates were 9.0% 
and 11.9% for recall-own and recall-partner tasks respectively, which rose to 22.4% and 23.9% 
after a week. Thus, as we predicted, for the recall-own task participants wrote down 
intrusions in the “other” column that they would otherwise have withheld, whilst in the 
recall-partner task they were already including them in the task-compliant column.   
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 The major focus of Experiment 3 was to understand the genesis of wrong-source 
errors, and to explore whether retrieval-task and delay influence wrong-source errors in 
different ways. There was clear evidence that this was the case, as consideration of the 3 
panels of Figure 2 reveals. The nature of the retrieval task had no impact upon the number 
of intrusions generated but it did influence the number of source errors generated. 
Conversely, delay had no impact upon the number of wrong-source errors generated, but it 
increased the number of intrusions generated.  However, this pattern of response 
generation did not map directly onto reported performance, because the propensity to 
accept a generated item as being task compliant itself differed across conditions.  
Overall, participants were more likely to include generated intrusion errors into their 
task-compliant responses than old-answers from the wrong source. This is not surprising, 
because old responses that came to mind will have been accompanied by source-specifying 
information that allowed participants to reject them as not being task compliant. 
Additionally, participants were more liberal in accepting generated responses as task 
compliant during the recall-partner task. The fact that this effect was stronger for intrusion 
errors than wrong-source errors is also consistent with the idea that the wrong-source 
errors were accompanied by source-specifying information that helped counteract the 
tendency to report their own answers as being their partner’s (and to a lesser extent their 
partner’s responses as their own, although the key interaction was not significant). This 
willingness to accept a generated answer as being task compliant increased after a delay, 
perhaps as a result of a lower report threshold, or a reduction in source-specifying details 
available to counteract this tendency.  Thus, whilst the observed pattern shown in panel C 
appears to suggest that intrusions and wrong-source errors are both equally frequent, and 
equally influenced by task and delay, it is clear from the different patterns for intrusion 
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errors and wrong-source errors that there is a strong role for late-correction-based 
monitoring in the production of the previously observed bias in wrong-source errors.  
At the same time the data on generated answers in Table 4 demonstrate an early 
selection effect, because responses associated with a particular source were generated 
more often when that source was the target of recall than they were when the other source 
was the target of recall. It is possible that participants may have not written down all the 
items that they thought of, and so this apparent early-selection effect could instead be 
thought of as a covert late-correction effect. Whilst this cannot be ruled out, it is not clear 
why this pattern did not vary with delay.  Delay led to a doubling of intrusion errors being 
written, consistent with a more liberal criterion for report. But, delay led to a reduction in 
wrong source-errors being reported, and no change in magnitude of the early selection 
effect observed. If participants were withholding non-target responses, one might expect 
this effect to mirror that seen for other non-target responses – intrusion errors – but this 
was not the case.  
Although we did see an early selection effect, it was relatively small. A potential 
reason for this is that the retrieval cue we specified is only one means of solving the task we 
set participants. Our instructions stressed one potential retrieval cue – one person in the 
dyad – but participants may have used other cues to retrieval, such as the semantic 
category cue, the environmental context, and so forth. Such retrieval cues are likely to 
access both target and non-target items, requiring late correction processes to achieve 
accurate recall. Thus, in our experiment, the observed early selection effect may have been 
small because other retrieval cues were available. Whilst this idea is speculative,  our belief 
is that both early selection and late correction processes are likely to be involved in many 
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retrieval tasks, but the weighting of each will reflect the ability of available retrieval cues to 
precisely access target memories. 
 In summary, it is clear that both early-selection and late-correction processes play a 
role in the reported rates of wrong-source errors seen in Experiment 2a, replicated in the 
reported responses in Experiment 3. As predicted, our own responses are more likely to 
intrude as competitors during a recall-partner task than our partner’s answers are to intrude 
during a recall-own task. Additionally, we are more liberal in accepting generated responses 
as being task compliant for a recall-partner task, and following a delay. These effects are 
additive on the wrong-source errors we report at output, and so we are particularly prone 
to mistakenly give away our own responses after a delay.  
General Discussion 
 Four experiments explored the extent to which source-errors occur during free recall. 
Previously, there has been an extensive literature demonstrating that people are likely to 
mistakenly include other’s ideas as their own when trying to recall their own idea, even 
when trying not to, a phenomenon known as unconscious plagiarism.  What has not been 
studied previously is the tendency to mistakenly report own ideas as having come from a 
partner or the tendency to mistakenly withhold answers from the correct source. Both of 
these findings were evident in the present set of studies.  
 Across all four experiments, participants were more likely to mistakenly report one 
of their own ideas when recalling their partner’s idea than they were to make a standard 
unconscious plagiarism error. This finding was demonstrated in all experiments when 
measured as a proportion of response output, and in three out of four experiments when 
measured in absolute terms. Thus, one product of the current set of studies is to act as a 
counterweight to the large number of studies that have focused on unconscious plagiarism 
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errors only. Whilst unconscious plagiarism errors resemble the egocentric biases reported in 
evaluations of contributions to joint work (e.g. Ross & Sicoly, 1979), the current studies 
suggest that unconscious plagiarism should not be interpreted as a self-serving bias. Rather, 
such errors are better understood as one particular instantiation of the broad problem of 
source-specified retrieval.  
 A second outcome of the current set of studies is to highlight the role of generation 
in the production of source-errors in recall, a topic that has been relatively neglected in the 
discussion of unconscious plagiarism to date. Instead theorists have sought to explain 
unconscious plagiarism in terms of memory strength (which we discuss below), or the 
source monitoring framework. However, neglecting the role of generation in free recall 
undermines attempts to draw theoretical conclusions about source monitoring. For example 
consider word-frequency as a manipulation. Studies of source-monitoring have shown more 
accurate source judgments for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words 
(Johnson, Raye, Foley & Foley, 1981). However, Marsh and Landau (1995) found no word-
frequency effect on rates of plagiarism in their recall-own tasks, and so concluded that 
plagiarism errors are not due to source-monitoring, but occur as a result of mistaken fluency.  
The present results generated by the extended recall paradigm suggest an alternative 
perspective. What Marsh and Landau (1995) failed to acknowledge is that a recognition-
based source-monitoring paradigm automatically controls for the generation of different 
kinds of ideas by providing them experimentally. Given an equal probability of being judged, 
source-monitoring accuracy is higher for low-frequency items (Johnson et al, 1981). But in a 
recall-task, the likelihood of generating high and low-frequency items may not been 
matched: participants in the Marsh and Landau (1995) study are likely to have generated 
more high-frequency exemplars, even if they reported no more high-frequency responses in 
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their output. That is, a bias in early selection could be balanced against source-monitoring 
based late-correction processes to produce a null effect on plagiarism rates. Thus, the 
conclusion that source-monitoring is not involved in unconscious plagiarism was premature. 
  Up until this point, we have discussed the patterns of findings for the experiments in 
terms of the source-monitoring framework, and early-selection and late-correction 
processes.  However, there is a strength-based signal detection based account of 
unconscious memory that has been used to explain unconscious plagiarism findings. This 
can explain some, but not all, of the data presented here. Figure 3 depicts Marsh and 
Bower’s (1993) model in which, the strength of responses that are initially self-generated is 
higher on average than the strength of responses generated by a partner, which are in turn 
higher than new ideas. At retrieval, responses that are generated with sufficient strength to 
pass the lower criterion are judged as old, whilst those with enough strength to pass the 
upper criterion are judged as being self-generated. Thus, answers are judged as coming 
from a partner if they are generated with sufficient strength to be recognized as old, but 
with insufficient strength to be judged as one’s own.  
 This relative-strength model was first proposed by Marsh and Bower (1993) and later 
tested by Marsh and Landau (1995). To test the model’s assumptions, Marsh and Landau 
(1995) had participants engage in a lexical decision task that involved items either 
previously generated or heard by the participant. Consistent with the model, words that had 
been previously generated were processed more quickly in the lexical decision task than 
words that had been heard, and words that were (later) plagiarized were processed more 
quickly than those that were not. Additionally, they showed that ideas later plagiarized in 
the recall-own task were processed more quickly than those later plagiarized in the 
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generate-new task, consistent with the assumption that the former fall above the criterion 
for recognition, and the latter fall below it.  
 Deriving precise predictions from this model regarding the relative frequency of 
recall-own and recall-partner plagiarism is problematic, because it depends upon the 
relative strengths of the own- and partner-distributions, and the position of the two criteria. 
Nevertheless, as illustrated in Figure 3, it is easy to see how the greater propensity to give 
away ideas than to steal them could emerge. If the upper threshold is set relatively 
cautiously, this will have the simultaneous effects of reducing the propensity to plagiarize 
and make intrusion errors during the recall-own task, but to simultaneously increase the 
propensity to attribute one’s own ideas to a partner and to make intrusion errors.  
 The model is also able to explain the different pattern we observed in the source 
errors depending upon the different contingency analyses.  The starting point for this 
explanation is the observation that not all available items are recalled.  For the sake of the 
argument we will consider items below the Cold criterion to be unavailable.  In this instance, 
performance can only be optimized by setting the Cown criterion to judge the source of each 
old idea that comes to mind, by outputting items above the criterion in the recall-own task 
and below it in the recall-partner task. The final placement of this criterion will in part rest 
upon the relative value placed upon each kind of source error, but the numerical impact of 
different criterion setting can be estimated.  
If participants had to distinguish all their own responses from all their partner’s 
responses (as in a source-monitoring task), the optimal performance would be when the 
Cown criterion is set at the intersection of the own and partner distributions.  However, in 
recall, this would predict a small difference in the absolute rate of source errors across 
source because all partner ideas above the criterion would be reported, but own ideas that 
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fell below the Cown criterion would only be reported if they were also above the Cold criterion. 
At the same time, ignoring intrusions, the proportion of source errors by task would be 
higher for the recall-partner task because fewer correct items would be output. This is what 
was observed. However, this ignores intrusion errors, which participants cannot.    
Placing the Cown criterion at the intersection of the own and partner response 
distributions is non-optimal because it fails to control for errors associated with intrusions: 
Lowering the criterion below the intersection between the own and partner distributions 
would be sub-optimal, because although correct recall-own recall would increase in line 
with the decrease in recall-partner recall, intrusions would also increase.  Conversely, raising 
the Cown criterion would benefit overall performance for the opposite reason. The change in 
the accuracy for the old ideas would be matched, but intrusions would decrease, at least up 
until the point at which the decrease in intrusions and wrong-source errors for partner recall 
matched the decrease in correct recall. Clearly, a very conservative Cown criterion would 
remove all errors, but at great cost to correct recall of own ideas. Thus, optimal 
performance is achieved with a criterion that is above the intersection of the own and 
partner distributions, but the exact placement of this criterion depends upon the relative 
strengths of the three distributions (and the value-weighting of each kind of outcome).  
The consequence of this criterion is exactly the pattern we observed: as a function of 
task, a conservative upper criterion is likely to produce relatively few wrong-source errors 
and intrusions in the recall-own task compared to the recall-partner task. This would be true 
both in terms of absolute rate, and proportion of output in a task and so it would predict the 
task-based biases observed here. However, it need not produce any such bias in the source-
based contingency analyses. This follows because the source-based analyses only consider 
responses above the Cold criterion, and there are more own-responses than partner 
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responses that pass this criterion. The exact proportions of own and partner ideas that are 
attributed to the correct source will depend jointly on the placement of the Cold and Cown 
criteria, and so no clear bias in source errors is necessarily predicted.  
 Whilst this model is able to account for these aspects of our data, it struggles to 
explain other aspects of our data. One is the difference in reporting rates for intrusion errors 
and wrong-source errors in Experiment 3. In this relative-strength model, the only 
difference between new items and a partner’s answers is their relative strength: against any 
criterion, during the recall-own task, more wrong-source errors should be generated than 
intrusions. This was indeed the case, as panel A of Figure 2 illustrates. However, as Panel B 
illustrates, participants in the recall-own task were much more likely to include generated 
intrusion errors than generated wrong-source errors. That is, a higher proportion of the 
generated ideas associated with the weaker source were included at output, which 
contradicts the model.  
 The model also has no mechanism by which an early-selection process can occur 
because the lower threshold provides the criterion for generating a response, whilst the 
upper criterion provides the means for making a source-judgment. It follows from this 
observation that the number of own responses correctly reported as own during a recall-
own task should match the number of own-responses correctly rejected in the recall-
partner task, with an equivalent prediction for partner-responses. But as we saw, 
participants demonstrated early selection effects, such that they were more likely to 
generate an idea that was task compliant. One potential criticism of this argument is that 
participants may not have reported all the responses that they generated. However, in 
order for there to have been fewer partner-responses generated during a recall-own task 
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than a recall-own task, a shift in criterion across tasks would be required, which is 
contradicted by the lack of a task effect on intrusion rates.  
  To summarise, neither the strength-based model, nor a purely post-retrieval source-
monitoring account can explain the full pattern of data reported here.  The single-strength 
model fails because it reduces strength to a property of the item, rather than a property of 
the cue-item match that varies across retrieval tasks, and the post-retrieval source-
monitoring account fails because it neglects the role of early selection processes in driving 
the kinds of items that need to be monitored.  
 We believe that our focus on early-selection and late-correction processes offers a 
fruitful direction for further research into how people control the accuracy of their recall 
(see Goldsmith, 2016 for a similar conclusion).  The majority of research in source-memory 
has been conducted using recognition based procedures, and source-contingent analyses. 
However, we often need to regulate the accuracy of what we recall during conversation: to 
date this issue has largely been researched with a recall-based paradigm focusing only on 
our ability to recall our own previous responses. We believe that the approach developed 
here, including the use of other forms of recall task, including recalling a partner’s ideas, and 
using an extended recall task, offers the potential to provide further insight into how people 
control the accuracy of their report, and what factors influence this ability.  
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Table 1: Experiment 1: The frequency of correct-source recall, wrong-source recall and 
intrusion errors in recall for recall-own and recall-partner tasks.  
 
 Recall-own Recall-partner 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Correct source 10.50 3.39 4.95 3.01 
Wrong source 0.95 1.74 1.63 1.96 
Intrusions 1.40 1.76 2.13 2.62 
% Source Error 6.5% 11.4% 17.4% 18.7% 
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Table 2: Experiment 2a: The frequency of correct-source recall, wrong-source recall and 
intrusion errors in recall for recall-own, and recall-partner tasks across delay.  
 
 
 1 day 1 week 
 Recall-Own Recall-Partner Recall-Own Recall-Partner 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Correct Source 23.1 2.19 15.1 3.62 17.3 3.74 10.1 3.19 
Wrong Source  1.50 1.43 3.65 2.97 3.25 3.09 6.50 3.45 
Intrusions 0.75 1.29 2.80 1.47 2.35 2.11 4.85 3.60 
% Source Error 5.7% 5.2% 16.3% 10.4% 13.4% 11.9% 30.6% 16.3% 
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Table 3: Experiment 2b: The frequency of correct-source recall, wrong-source recall and 
intrusion errors written as own, or partner’s responses in joint recall tasks across delay. 
 
 
 1 day 1 week 
 Recall Own Recall Partner Recall Own Recall Partner 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Correct Source 23.1 4.72 15.8 3.82 17.6 4.31 10.4 4.75 
Wrong Source  1.53 1.12 1.42 1.08 3.15 2.50 3.63 2.33 
Intrusions 1.42 2.29 2.68 2.87 3.42 3.55 5.21 3.69 
% Source Error 6.1% 4.6% 7.5% 6.3% 12.1% 8.8% 19.4% 11.3% 
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Table 4: Experiment 3: The frequency of correct-source recall, wrong-source recall and 
intrusion errors in recall for recall-own and recall-partner tasks that were either generated 
(written anywhere on the response sheet), or included as task-compliant in the output.  
 
  1 day 1 week 
 Recall-own Recall-partner Recall-own Recall-partner 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Items included as task compliant 
Correct  source 48.8 5.19 35.9 8.55 37.0 5.17 26.3 7.31 
Wrong source 2.75 1.92 5.70 3.39 8.30 4.03 12.2 5.97 
Intrusions 1.45 1.31 5.25 3.82 5.90 4.32 11.8 6.63 
% Source Error 5.2% 3.6% 12.7% 8.4% 16.0% 6.9% 23.7% 7.9% 
Items generated during retrieval 
Correct source 52.25 4.14 38.50 8.22 45.85 7.11 32.29 8.39 
Wrong source 34.95  7.20 42.65 13.89 28.60 7.24 39.67 10.13 
Intrusions 8.60 4.75 10.95 6.32 21.55 16.44 22.57 13.00 
% Source Error 36.2 % 3.9% 45.2% 10.5% 30.2% 5.6% 42.6% 7.3% 
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of differing recall for recall-own (RO) and recall-partner 
(RP) tasks. The different areas in each column depicts the potential for different numbers of 
items to be correctly recalled (CR), recalled from the wrong source (WS), or to be produced 
as an intrusion (I) in each retrieval task.  
 
 
 
Recall-own task Recall-partner task 
Correct recall of own responses 
 
 
CRro 
 
 
 
 
Correct recall of partner’s responses 
 
CRrp 
 
 
 
Recall of own responses 
WSrp 
  
  
Recall of partner’s responses 
WSro 
 
Intrusions (new items) 
Irp 
 
Intrusions (new items)  
Iro  
 
 
 
 
Notes:  These proportions of items can be used to derive the proportion of wrong-source 
errors, either as a function of the task, or as a function of the original source. For task-
contingent analysis, the proportion of source errors is given by: Recall own = WSro  / (CRro + 
WSro + Iro), Recall partner = WSrp  / (CRrp + WSrp + Irp). For source-contingent analysis, the 
proportion of source errors is given by: Own ideas = WSrp / (CRro + WSrp), Partner ideas = 
WSro / (CRrp + WSro). 
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Figure 2: Experiment 3: The number of non-target responses generated during retrieval 
(Panel A), the proportion of these reported as task compliant (Panel B) and the resultant 
number of intrusion errors and wrong-source errors reported as task compliant (Panel C) for 
recall-own (RO) and recall-partner (RP) tasks tested after a delay of 1 day or 1 week. Error 
bars depict the standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 3: Schematic representation of the relative-strength model of unconscious plagiarism 
from Marsh and Landau (1995). 
 
 
 
Notes: Hypothetical strength distributions for new ideas (dashed line), ideas generated by a 
partner (dotted line), and own ideas (solid line). The upper criterion (Cown) represents the 
strength threshold above which items are classified as own, and the lower threshold (Cold) 
represents the strength criterion at which items are judged as old. Items falling between the 
two criteria are judged to have come from a partner.   
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